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Abstract Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between peo-
ple and automated agents we organized the rst automated negotiating agents
competition (ANAC 2010). The purpose of the competition is to facilitate the
research in the area bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition
was based on the Genius environment, which is a General Environment for
Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. The rst com-
petition was held in conjunction with the Ninth International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10) and was com-
prised of seven teams. This paper presents an overview of the competition,
as well as general and contrasting approaches towards negotiation strategies
that were adopted by the participants of the competition. Based on analysis
in post{tournament experiments, the paper also attempts to provide some
insights with regard to eective approaches towards the design of negotiation
strategies.
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1 Introduction
Negotiation is an important process to form alliances and to reach trade
agreements. Research in the eld of negotiation originates from various disci-
plines including economics, social science, game theory and articial intelli-
gence (e.g., [?, ?, ?]). Automated agents can be used side by side the human
negotiator embarking on an important negotiation task. They can alleviate
some of the eorts required of people during negotiations and also assist
people that are less qualied in the negotiation process. There may even be
situations in which automated negotiators can replace the human negotiators.
Another possibility is for people to use these agents as a training tool, prior
to actually performing the task. Thus, success in developing an automated
agent with negotiation capabilities has great advantages and implications.
In order to help focus research on prociently negotiating automated
agents, we have organized the rst automated negotiating agents competition
(ANAC). The principal goals of the ANAC competition are as follows:
 Encouraging the design of agents that can prociently negotiate in a vari-
ety of circumstances,
 Objectively evaluating dierent bargaining strategies,
 Exploring dierent learning and adaptation strategies and opponent mod-
els, and
 Collecting state-of-the-art negotiating agents, negotiation domains, and
preference proles, and making them available and accessible for the ne-
gotiation research community.
A number of successful negotiation strategies already exist in literature
[?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. However, the results of the dierent implementations are
dicult to compare, as various setups are used for experiments in ad hoc
negotiation environments [?, ?]. An additional goal of ANAC is to build a
community in which work on negotiating agents can be compared by stan-
dardized negotiation benchmarks to evaluate the performance of both new
and existing agents.
In designing procient negotiating agents, standard game-theoretic ap-
proaches cannot be directly applied. Game theory models assume complete
information settings and perfect rationality [?]. However, human behavior
is diverse and cannot be captured by a monolithic model. Humans tend to
make mistakes, and they are aected by cognitive, social and cultural factors
[?, ?, ?, ?]. A means of overcoming these limitations is to use heuristic ap-
proaches to design negotiating agents. When negotiating agents are designed
using a heuristic method, we need an extensive evaluation, typically through
simulations and empirical analysis.
We have recently introduced an environment that allowed us to eval-
uate agents in a negotiation competition such as ANAC: Genius [?], a
General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage
Simulation. Genius helps facilitating the design and evaluation of automated2 General Design of ANAC 3
negotiators' strategies. It allows easy development and integration of exist-
ing negotiating agents, and can be used to simulate individual negotiation
sessions, as well as tournaments between negotiating agents in various nego-
tiation scenarios. The design of general automated agents that can negotiate
prociently is a challenging task, as the designer must consider dierent possi-
ble environments and constraints. Genius can assist in this task, by allowing
the specication of dierent negotiation domains and preference proles by
means of a graphical user interface. It can be used to train human negotiators
by means of negotiations against automated agents or other people. Further-
more, it can be used to teach the design of generic automated negotiating
agents.
With Genius in place, we organized ANAC with the aim of coordinating
the research into automated agent design and procient negotiation strategies
for bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation, similar to what the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) achieved for the trading agent problem [?].
We believe ANAC is an important and useful addition to existing negoti-
ation competitions, which are either aimed at human negotiations or have a
dierent focus, as we explain in Section 2.8.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview over the design choices for ANAC, including the model of negotia-
tion, tournament platform and evaluation criteria. In Section 3, we present
the setup of ANAC 2010 followed by Section 4 that layouts the results of
competition. In Section 5 we discuss proposed outline for the future ANAC
competitions, and nally, Section 6 outlines our conclusions and our plans
for future competitions.
2 General Design of ANAC
One of the goals of ANAC is to encourage the design of agents that can ne-
gotiate in a variety of circumstances. This means the agents should be able
to negotiate against any type of opponent within arbitrary domains. Such
an open environment lacks a central mechanism for controlling the agents'
behavior, and the agents may encounter human decision-makers who make
mistakes and whose behavior is diverse, cannot be captured by a monolithic
model, is aected by cognitive, social and cultural factors, etc. [?, ?]. Ex-
amples of such environments include online markets, patient care-delivery
systems, virtual reality and simulation systems used for training (e.g., the
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) [?]). The use of open environments is im-
portant as the automated agent needs to be able to interact with dierent
types of opponents, who have dierent characteristics, e.g. people that origin
from dierent countries and cultures. Automated negotiation agents capa-
ble of negotiating prociently with people thus must deal with the fact that4 Baarslag et al.
people are diverse in their behavior and each individual might negotiate in a
dierent manner.
The design of the competition was focused on the development of negoti-
ating strategies, rather than other aspects of the negotiation process (though
not less important aspects) such as preference elicitation, argumentation or
mediation. The setup of ANAC was designed to make a balance between
several concerns, including:
 Strategic challenge: the game should present dicult negotiation domains
in a real{world setting with real{time deadlines.
 Multiplicity of issues on dierent domains, with a priori unknown opponent
preferences.
 Realism: realistic domains with varying opponent preferences.
 Clarity of rules, negotiation protocols, and agent implementation details.
We specify the general choices that were made for ANAC with regard to
negotiation model and the tournament setup.
2.1 Negotiation Model
In order to dene the setup of the negotiation competition, we rst introduce
the model of negotiation that we use. In this competition, we only consider
bilateral negotiations, i.e. a negotiation between two parties. The parties ne-
gotiate over issues, and every issue has an associated range of alternatives
or values. A negotiation outcome consists of a mapping of every issue to a
value, and the set 
 of all possible outcomes is called the negotiation domain.
The domain is common knowledge to the negotiating parties and stays xed
during a single negotiation session.
We further assume that both parties have certain preferences prescribed
by a preference prole over 
. These preferences can be modeled by means
of a utility function U that maps a possible outcome ! 2 
 to a real-valued
number in the range [0;1]. In contrast to the domain, the preference prole
of the players is private information.
Finally, the interaction between negotiating parties is regulated by a ne-
gotiation protocol that denes the rules of how and when proposals can be
exchanged. We use the alternating-oers protocol for bilateral negotiation as
proposed in [?], in which the negotiating parties exchange oers in turns. The
alternating-oers protocol conforms with our criterion to have simplicity of
rules. It is widely studied and used in literature, both in game-theoretic and
heuristic settings of negotiation (a non-exhaustive list includes [?, ?, ?, ?, ?]).2 General Design of ANAC 5
2.2 Tournament Platform
As a tournament platform to run and analyze the negotiations, we use the
Genius environment (General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent
multi-purpose Usage Simulation) [?]. Genius is a research tool for auto-
mated multi{issue negotiation, that facilitates the design and evaluation of
automated negotiators' strategies. It also provides an easily accessible frame-
work to develop negotiating agents via a public API. This setup makes it
straightforward to implement an agent and to focus on the development of
strategies that work in a general environment.
Genius incorporates several mechanisms that aim to support the design
of a general automated negotiator. The rst mechanism is an analytical tool-
box, which provides a variety of tools to analyze the performance of agents,
the outcome of the negotiation and its dynamics. The second mechanism is
a repository of domains and utility functions. Lastly, it also comprises repos-
itories of automated negotiators. In addition, Genius enables the evaluation
of dierent strategies used by automated agents that were designed using the
tool. This is an important contribution as it allows researchers to empirically
and objectively compare their agents with others in dierent domains and
settings.
2.3 Domains and Preference Proles
The specications of the domain and preferences, such as the constitution
and valuation of issues, can be of great inuence on the negotiation outcome.
We assume that all agents have complete information about the domain, but
the preference prole of the players is private information. Thus, if a strategy
attempts to tailor its oers to the needs of the opponent, it is required to
model the opponent. As the amount of information exchanged during the
negotiation is limited in a closed negotiation, the size of the domain has a
big impact on the learning capabilities of the agents.
For example, for ANAC 2010, we used a domain named Itex{Cypress
[?], in which a buyer and a seller of bicycle components negotiate about
issues such as the price of the components and delivery times. There are few
possible values per issue, creating a domain of only 180 potential oers. Such
a small domain simplies the task of getting a good picture of the opponent's
preferences by studying its proposal behavior.
Due to the sensitivity to the domain specics, negotiation strategies have
to be assessed on negotiation domains of various sizes and of various com-
plexity [?]. Therefore, we selected several domains for ANAC, with dierent
characteristics.
Negotiation strategies can also depend on whether preferences of the nego-
tiating parties are opposed or not. The notion of weak and strong opposition6 Baarslag et al.
can be formally dened [?]. Strong opposition is typical of competitive do-
mains, when a gain for one party can be achieved only at a loss for the other
party. Conversely, weak opposition means that both parties achieve either
losses or gains simultaneously.
Negotiation strategies may depend on the opposition of the preferences.
For example, in the case of Itex{Cypress the opposition is strong as it con-
cerns a manufacturer negotiating with a consumer. In such a case the parties
have naturally opposing requirements. Hence, the selection of preference pro-
les should also take into account that the preference proles have a good
variety of opposition.
As stated in the negotiation model, we assume that the negotiating parties
have a certain preference prole which can be modeled by a utility function
U that maps a possible outcome to a real-valued number in [0;1].
There are various ways to represent such a utility function (cf. [?]). For
ANAC, we have chosen domains without (preferential) dependencies between
issues, i.e.: the contribution of every issue to the utility is linear and does not
depend on the values of other issues. An advantage of independence between
issues is that algorithms that search for a proposal with a particular utility
can be implemented in a computationally ecient way. It also makes it easier
for negotiation strategies to eciently model the opponent's preferences, as
it reduces the amount of information that is to be learned by a preference
learning technique.
When the tradeos between issues are (preferentially) independent, then
an additive scoring system is appropriate [?]. Therefore, we assume that
utility functions are additive [?, ?, ?]. That is, in a domain 
 with an outcome
! = (!1;:::;!m), we assume the utility function has the following form:
U(!) =
m X
i=1
wi  ui(!i);
where the wi are normalized weights (i.e.
P
wi = 1) and ui(!i) is an eval-
uation function with range [0;1] for every individual issue xi.
2.4 Protocol and Deadline
To add to the realism of the protocol, we can supplement it with a deadline
and discount factors. We impose a real{time deadline on the negotiation pro-
cess for both theoretical and practical reasons. The pragmatic reason is that
without a deadline, the negotiation might go on forever, especially without
any discount factors. Secondly, with unlimited time an agent may simply try
a huge amount of proposals to learn the opponent's preferences. Another rea-
son for introducing a real-time deadline in the alternating oers protocol is
the various challenges it poses to the competitors, as described in Section 2.7.2 General Design of ANAC 7
We believe that a negotiation model with a real-time deadline comes closer
to realistic negotiation environment.
2.5 Scoring
We now move on to a formal description of the utility and nal scoring func-
tions. Let D be our set of domains. For every domain D 2 D two preference
proles exist, PD = fPD
1 ;PD
2 g. Let A be the set of competing agents, with
jAj = n. Every agent competes against all other agents on all domains (see
Section 2.3), alternating between the two preference proles dened on that
domain.
Suppose agent A negotiates with B on domain D 2 D, where A has the
rst preference prole PD
1 and B uses PD
2 . If they reach a certain outcome
!, in which A receives the associated utility U(!), then we denote this utility
with
UD
A!B:
Our evaluation metric is dened as follows. Every agent A plays against all
agents B 2 A, with the exception that A will not play itself. The score for A is
averaged over all trials, playing with both preference proles P1 and P2 (e.g.,
on the Itex{Cypress domain, A will play both as Itex and as Cypress against
all others). That is, for each prole P 2 PD an average utility uD(A;P) is
calculated for each agent:
uD(A;P1) =
1
n   1
X
B2AnfAg
UD
A!B;
and
uD(A;P2) =
1
n   1
X
B2AnfAg
UD
B!A:
The average utility is then re-normalized using the maximum and minimum
utility achieved by all other agents for that prole:
e uD(A;P) =
uD(A;P)   min
B2AnfAg
uD(B;P)
max
B2AnfAg
uD(B;P)   min
B2AnfAg
uD(B;P)
:
This gives a score per prole, which is averaged over the two proles in the
domain to give an overall normalized domain-score. The domain-score is then
averaged over all trials and the nal score s(A) of an agent is determined as
an average of the domain-scores:8 Baarslag et al.
s(A) =
1
jDj
X
D2D

1
2
e uD(A;P1) +
1
2
e uD(A;P2)

:
2.6 ANAC Rules
To enter the competition the teams had to register and upload their agents
by a given deadline. The time frame for the submission allowed teams to
upload their agents for compliance checks prior to the ocial deadline.
The tournament itself consists of several rounds. If more than 16 agents
are submitted, a qualifying round is held to select the best 16 agents. If an
insucient number of agents is submitted we preserved the right to either
run one nal round, or to add agents from the repository available at Genius
at the moment in which we run the qualifying rounds. During the qualifying
rounds, tournaments will be played with four agents each, the winners of
those tournaments go to the next qualifying round until there are 16 agents
in the competition. The top 16 agents proceed to the quarter nals. During
the quarter nals rounds, four tournaments are played with four agents each,
the top two agents then proceed to the semi-nals. During the semi-nals, two
tournaments are played with four agents each, the best two agents proceed to
the nals. The nals consist of one tournament with the best four agents of
the semi-nals. The best agent wins the competition. In case two agents share
the best score, the average results of the two agents when playing against each
other will be used to determine the winner.
The domains and preference proles used during the competition are not
known in advance and were designed by the organizing team. The size of the
domains can be up to 10 issues. The structure of a negotiation domain is
xed before the tournament and cannot be changed during negotiation.
An agent's success is measured using the evaluation metric (see Section
2.5) in all negotiations of the tournament for which it is scheduled.
Agents can be disqualied for violating the spirit of fair play. In particular,
the following behaviors were strictly prohibited:
 Design an agent in such a way that it benets some specic other agent.
 Communication with the agent during the competition.
 Alter the agent during the competition.
 Denial-of-service attacks.
 Agents employ API operations for the purpose of occupying or loading the
game servers.2 General Design of ANAC 9
2.7 Challenges
Our aim in designing ANAC was to provide a strategic challenge on multiple
accounts. According to our goals set forward in Section 1, we selected real-life
domains containing multiple issues and preference proles that are unknown
to the opponent. Our setup guarantees the participating teams have to deal
with the following challenges:
Incomplete information
Suppose an agent wants to model the utility function of the opponent.
Because of incompleteness of information about the opponent, it has to
learn the opponent's preferences during the negotiation by studying the
proposal behavior. Our protocol only allows proposals to be exchanged,
so the communication between the agents is very limited. This prevents
agents to share information about their preferences, other than by their
proposal behavior. Consequently, if agents want to use an opponent model
to make eective proposals, they have to make use of a sophisticated learn-
ing technique.
Domain complexity
Analyzing the domain for benecial outcomes is essential when imple-
menting an ecient proposal strategy. Even when an agent has gathered
information about its opponent, it still has to be able to nd win{win sit-
uations, for example by computing the Pareto frontier.
Real-time deadline
Dealing with all of the above while taking into account a real{time dead-
line. Agents should be more willing to concede near the deadline, as a
break-o yields zero utility for both agents. A real{time deadline also
makes it necessary to employ a strategy to decide when to accept an of-
fer. Deciding when to accept involves some prediction whether or not a
signicantly better opportunity might occur in the future.
Some parts of ANAC are less demanding: the utility functions are (linearly)
additive functions, so there are no dependencies between issues. This means
the utility of an oer can be eectively computed and conversely, a proposal of
a certain utility can be easily generated. Moreover, additive utility functions
make it fairly easy to enumerate proposals from best to worst. Secondly,
agents are completely aware of their own preferences and the corresponding
utility values.10 Baarslag et al.
2.8 Related Competitions
Some parts of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) and the Agent Reputa-
tion Trust (ART) Competition also relate to automated agents negotiation.
We provide a short description of both competitions and outline the dier-
ences with ANAC. For 2010, TAC is divided into three games [?, ?, ?, ?]:
TAC SCM
TAC Supply Chain Management was designed to simulate a dynamic sup-
ply chain environment. Agents have to compete to secure customer orders
and components required for production. In order to do so, the agents
have to plan and coordinate their activities across the supply chain. Par-
ticipants face the complexities of supply chains, which admits a variety of
bidding and negotiation strategies.
TAC/AA
In the TAC Ad Auction, game entrants design and implement bidding
strategies for advertisers in a simulated sponsoring environment. The
agents have to bid against each other to get an ad placement that is related
to certain keyword combinations in a web search tool. The search engine
simulates clicks and sale conversions, yielding revenues for the advertiser.
The advertiser strategies have to decide which keywords to bid on, and
what prices to oer. Therefore, the strategies have to optimize their data
analysis and bidding tactics to maximize their prot.
CAT
The CAT Competition or TAC Market Design is a reverse of the normal
TAC game: as an entrant you dene the rules for matching buyers and
sellers, while the trading agents are created by the organizers of the com-
petition. Entrants have to compete against each other to build a robust
market mechanism that attracts buyers and sellers. The market needs to
make prot by setting appropriate commission fees and at the same time
attract enough traders, while also adapting to changing environmental
conditions.
Some elements of TAC have similar challenges as posed by ANAC, especially
the games of TAC SCM and TAC/AA. The games can get very complex and
the domains of the games are specically chosen to model a certain scenario
of a trading agent problem. On the other hand, the entrants of ANAC have
to consider very general negotiation domains when they design their agents.
This makes it very easy to implement a simple agent that can participate in
ANAC.
We believe that the ANAC is already very challenging despite its seemingly
simple setup. The current design of ANAC poses a lot of challenges, such as
a real timeline and the incomplete information of the opponent's preferences3 Design of ANAC 2010 11
(see also Section 2.7). Moreover, a transparent setup makes it easier to allow
insight into the implications of design choices.
The Agent Reputation Trust (ART) Competition [?, ?] is also a negotiat-
ing agent competition with a testbed that allows the comparison of dierent
strategies. The ART competition simulates a business environment for soft-
ware agents that use the reputation concept to buy advices about paintings.
Each agent in the game is a service provider responsible for selling its opin-
ions when requested. The agent can exchange information with other agents
to improve the quality of their appraisals. The challenge is to perceive when
an agent can be trusted and to establish a trustworthy reputation.
Compared to ANAC, the focus of ART is more on trust: the goal is to
perceive which agents can be trusted in a negotiation process and what rep-
utation should be attributed to each agent.
3 Design of ANAC 2010
ANAC 2010 was held at the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10) in Toronto, Canada, with pre-
sentations of the participating teams and a closing discussion (see Section 5).
AAMAS is a well-suited platform to host the competition, as it is the premier
scientic conference for research on autonomous agents and multiagent sys-
tems, which includes researchers on automated negotiation. It brings together
an international community of researchers that are well-suited to tackle the
automated agents negotiation challenges posed by ANAC.
3.1 Teams
ANAC 2010 had seven participating teams from ve dierent universities, as
listed in Table 1.
IAMhaggler University of Southampton
IAMcrazyHaggler University of Southampton
Agent K Nagoya Institute of Technology
Nozomi Nagoya Institute of Technology
FSEGA Babes Bolyai University
Agent Smith TU Delft
Yushu University of Massachusetts Amherst
Table 1 The participating teams of ANAC 2010.12 Baarslag et al.
3.2 Domains
We approached the design of ANAC to comply with the goals that were
described in Section 1. Because ANAC is aimed towards multi-issue nego-
tiations under uncertainty in open environments, we selected the following
domains and proles after the participating agents had been submitted. We
aimed for a good spread of the relevant parameters, such as the number of
issues, the number of possible proposals and the opposition of the domain
(see Table 2).
Itex{Cypress
Our rst scenario, taken from [?], is a buyer{seller business negotiation for
one commodity. It involves representatives of two companies: Itex Manufac-
turing, a producer of bicycle components and Cypress Cycles, a builder of
bicycles. There are four issues that both sides have to discuss: the price of the
components, delivery times, payment arrangements and terms for the return
of possibly defective parts. An example outcome would be:
($3.98, 45 days, payment upon delivery, 5% spoilage allowed):
The opposition is strong in this domain, as the manufacturer and consumer
have naturally opposing needs and requirements. Altogether, there are 180
potential oers that contain all combinations of values for the four issues.
Zimbabwe{England
The second domain taken from [?, ?] involves a case where England and
Zimbabwe are negotiating to reach an agreement in response to the world's
rst public health treaty: the World Health Organization's Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control. The leaders of both countries must reach an
agreement on ve issues:
1. Funding amount
The total amount to be deposited into a fund to aid countries that are
economically dependent on tobacco production. This issue has a negative
impact on the budget of England and a positive eect on the economy of
Zimbabwe. The possible values are no agreement, $10, $50 or $100 billion.
Thus, this issue has a total of four possible values.3 Design of ANAC 2010 13
2. Other aid programs
The impact on other aid programs. If other aid programs are reduced, then
this will create economic diculties for Zimbabwe. Possible values are:
a. No reduction;
b. Reduction equal to half of the fund;
c. Reduction equal to the whole size of the fund;
d. No agreement.
Thus, a total of four possible values are allowed for this issue.
3.&4. Trade barriers
Trade issues for both countries. Zimbabwe and England can use trade bar-
riers such as taris (taxes on imports) or they can abstain from restrictive
trade barriers to increase imports from the other party.
There is a trade-o in revenue of these policies: taris increases short-time
revenue, but can lead to higher consumers prices. Decreasing import is
good for local industries but it can decrease costumer welfare due to the
increase in costumer costs. There are actually two issues here: the trade
barriers that either side decides to use. Zimbabwe's possible values are
divided between
a. Reducing taris on imports;
b. Increasing taris on imports;
c. No agreement.
While England can choose between
a. Reducing imports;
b. Increasing imports;
c. No agreement.
Thus, a total of three possible values are allowed for each of the two issues.
5. Creation of a forum
A forum can be created to explore other arrangements for health-issues.
Zimbabwe would like to establish such a fund, to be able to apply to
other global health agreements in the future, while this would be costly
for England. The four possible values are:
a. Creation of a fund;
b. Creation of a committee that will discuss the creation of a fund;
c. Creation of a committee that will develop an agenda for future discus-
sions;
d. No agreement.
Consequently, the domain has a total of 43  32 = 576 possible agreements.
England and Zimbabwe have contradictory preferences for the rst two issues,14 Baarslag et al.
but the other issues have options that are jointly preferred by both sides,
making it a domain of medium opposition.
Travel
Our nal domain has two persons negotiating to go on holiday to a location.
From a small travel recommendation system we obtained multiple real{life
proles of travelers. They can each list their preferences on properties of a
holiday destination:
1. Atmosphere.
2. Amusement.
3. Culinary.
4. Shopping.
5. Culture.
6. Sport.
7. Environment.
There are seven issues to discuss, all with a fairly large amount of choices.
This leads to a big oers space of 188,160 possibilities. A sample negotiation
outcome reads:
(Hospitable, Nightlife and entertainment, International cuisine, Small
boutiques, Art galleries, Outdoor activities, Parks and gardens).
The opposition is weak in this domain, because traveling friends may have
very compatible interests. Still the challenge is to nd this optimal outcome
in such a big search space.
Itex{Cypress Zimbabwe{England Travel
Number of issues 4 5 7
Size 180 576 188,160
Opposition Strong Medium Weak
Table 2 The domains used in ANAC 2010.
3.3 Deadline
We impose a real{time deadline on the negotiation process for reasons stated
in Section 2.4. In ANAC 2010, the agents are bound to three minutes each
to deliberate. This allowed every agent to utilize the same CPU time, but4 Tournament Results 15
it forces agents to keep track of the time that the opponent has left. This
feature may undergo a small change in the next ANAC (see Section 5).
While the domains of the rst ANAC competition did not include any dis-
count factors, we do plan to add this feature to the next ANAC competition
to be held in 2011 (see the discussion in Section 5).
4 Tournament Results
We describe the normalized domain scores of every agent in ANAC 2010 in
Table 3. The normalized domain score is obtained by averaging the score
against the other agents on multiple trials. All agents use both of the proles
that are linked to a domain (see Section 2.5 for more details on the scoring).
The nal score is listed in the last column, thus making Agent K the winner
of ANAC 2010.
4.1 Overall Scoring
Score per domain
Rank Agent Itex-Cyp Eng-Zimb Travel Avg
1 Agent K 0.901 0.712 0.685 0.766
2 Yushu 0.662 1.0 0.250 0.637
3 Nozomi 0.929 0.351 0.516 0.599
4 IAMhaggler 0.668 0.551 0.500 0.573
5 FSEGA 0.722 0.406 0 0.376
6 IAMcrazyHaggler 0.097 0.397 0.431 0.308
7 Agent Smith 0.069 0.053 0 0.041
Table 3 Normalized scores of every agent per domain.
For every domain, due to the normalization of the scores, the lowest possi-
ble score is 0 and the highest is 1. The fact that the maximum and minimum
score are not always achieved, can be explained by non-deterministic behavior
of the agents: the top-ranking agent on one domain does not always obtain
the maximum score on every trial.
Agent K has won by a big margin, but it only managed to dominate on
the Travel domain. On both Itex{Cypress and England{Zimbabwe, it earned
second place after Nozomi and Yushu, respectively. Its consistent high scoring
made Agent K the winner of ANAC. Only IAMhaggler managed to mirror
this consistent scoring on all three domains.16 Baarslag et al.
4.2 Negotiation Strategies
We present a discussion of the strategies used by the participating agents.
We compare the strategies by highlighting both common and contrasting
approaches taken in the general strategic design. We are concerned with the
following aspects of proposal strategies:
Proposal behavior
For every agent, we give a brief overview of the basic decisions that com-
prise the agents' inner proposal loop. We also describe the criteria for
accepting an oer. Either of the two can be decided in a deterministic or
non-deterministic manner.
Learning
In order to reach an advantageous negotiation agreement, it is benecial to
have as much information about the preference prole of an opponent as
possible. If an agent can take into consideration the opponent's interests
and learn during their interactions, then their utility might increase [?].
Because of the closed negotiation setting of ANAC, the negotiating parties
exchange only proposals, but they do not share any information about
their preferences. To overcome this problem, a negotiating agent may try
to obtain a model of the preference prole of its opponent by means of
learning.
For the participating agents, we are concerned how their strategies model
the opponent
Timing aspects
There are substantial risks associated with delaying the submission of a
proposal at the end of the negotiation. These risks arise from unpredictable
delays and can cause proposals to be received when the game is already
over. Agents can try to estimate the length of their negotiation cycles to
cope with these risks. The agents can then concede in the nal phase of
the negotiation, or place their proposals in some calculated amount of time
before the end. We examine whether the agents make any predictions on
how many time is left and how they use this information.
Table 4 gives an overview of the strategies of all agents. In the \Time
dependent" column, we address whether the proposal strategies keep track
of the time that is left and change their proposals accordingly. The next
column species what kind of learning method the agents use to generate the
next oer. When agents decide to accept an oer, all take the oer's utility
in account (U), but some of them also consider the remaining time (T).
Finally, most of the agents are non-deterministic. For example, Agent K
may decide on a certain proposal target. But if it previously received even
better oers B, then it will counteroer a random oer taken from B. Oth-
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oer that satises its proposal target. Most agents have this same mechanism:
when they are indierent between certain oers, they will choose randomly.
Time de-
pendent
Learning
method
Acceptance
Criteria
Deterministic
Agent K Yes All proposals T/U No
Yushu Yes Best proposals T/U No
Nozomi No Compromises T/U No
IAMhaggler Yes Bayesian U No
FSEGA Yes Bayesian U Yes
IAMcrazyHaggler No None U No
Agent Smith Yes Weights T/U Yes
Table 4 Strategies of the agents participated in ANAC.
We continue to report on the individual strategies of the ANAC agents,
starting with the winner.
4.2.1 Agent K
The proposal mechanism of Agent K [?] works as follows: based on the pre-
vious proposals of the opponent and the time that is left, it sets a so-called
proposal target (initially set to 1). If it already received an oer that matches
at least the utility of the proposal target, it will oer this proposal to improve
the chances of acceptance. Otherwise, it searches for random proposals that
are at at least as good as the proposal target. If no such proposals are found,
the proposal target is slightly lowered.
The agent has a sophisticated mechanism to accept an oer. It uses the
mean and variance of the utility of all received oers, and then tries to deter-
mine the best oer it might receive in the future and sets its proposal target
accordingly. It then accepts or rejects the oer, based on the probability that
a better oer might be proposed. For more information and technical details
on Agent K, see [?].
4.2.2 Yushu
Yushu [?] is a fairly simple agent that makes use of a target utility to make
its next oer. As a learning mechanism, it uses the ten best proposals made
by the opponent, called suggested proposals. It also makes an estimate of how
many rounds are still left for the negotiation. Combining this information,
Yushu obtains the target utility. It also keeps track of the acceptability-rate:18 Baarslag et al.
the minimum utility it is willing to accept. To set the acceptability-rate,
Yushu rst nds the best possible utility that can be obtained in the domain,
and accepts no less than 96% of it. When the number of estimated future
rounds becomes short, this percentage is lowered to 92%.
The agent can only accept a proposal when the oered utility is above the
target utility or when the utility reaches the acceptability-rate. Provided that
either of the two is the case it accepts, when there are less than eight rounds
left. When there is more time, it will accept only if it cannot nd a suggested
proposal with a better utility. If a better suggested proposal is available, it
will oer that instead.
4.2.3 Nozomi
The proposal strategy of Nozomi [?] starts with an oer of maximum utility.
It denes the gap between two parties as the dierences in utility of their
last oers. Depending on the gap and time that is left, it then chooses to
make a certain proposal type, such as making a compromise, or staying put.
Nozomi keeps track of the compromises made, but the agent does not model
the utility function of the opponent.
The agent splits the negotiation into four intervals around 50%, 80% and
90% of the negotiation time. Based on previous oers, the gap between the
two parties, and the time that is left in the negotiation, it will choose whether
to accept an oer or reject it.
4.2.4 IAM(crazy)Haggler
IAMhaggler and IAMcrazyHaggler (cf. [?]) are both implementations of a
framework called SouthamptonAgent, thus creating a lot of similarity be-
tween the two agents. The SouthamptonAgent provides standard methods
for handling oers, proposing oers and keeping track of time. The frame-
work is the only one that also keeps track of the time that the opponent
uses.
IAMcrazyHaggler is a very simple take-it-or-leave-it strategy: it will make
random proposals with a utility that is above a constant threshold, set to
0.9 (without discount factors it is set to 0.95). The proposal is done without
regard to time or opponent moves.
IAMHaggler, on the other hand, is a fully edged negotiation strategy,
which incorporates a model of the opponent using Bayesian learning. It starts
with a proposal of maximum utility and successively sets a target utility
based on multiple factors, such as: the utility oered by the opponent, the
time left for both agents, and the perceived opponent's pro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headedness. Upon receiving an oer, it analyzes the previous proposals of
the opponent and adapts the hypotheses on the opponent's utility function.
With this opponent model, it tries to nd trade-os that satisfy the target
utility.
Let u be the utility of the last opponent's oer. Both agents accept an
oer depending on u, namely when either of the following three conditions is
met:
1. When u is at least 98% of the utility of its own previous oer.
2. When u is at least 98% of a maximum aspiration constant. The default
value is 0.9, but if there are discount factors it is set to 0.85 for IAMcrazy-
Haggler to make it reach an agreement sooner.
3. When u is at least 98% of the utility of its own upcoming oer.
Note that the three conditions only depend on the utility of the oer and not
on the available time.
4.2.5 FSEGA
Similar to Nozomi, the FSEGA strategy [?] splits the negotiation into three
intervals of time and applies dierent sub-strategies to each interval:
1. The rst interval consists of the starting 85% of the negotiation time and
is mainly used to acquire the opponent's prole from the counter-oers.
2. In the next 10%, the proposal strategy still does not concede, but relaxes
some conditions for selecting the next proposal to improve the chances
that the opponent accepts. The agent makes only small concessions and
still tries to learn the opponent's prole.
3. In the nal 5%, FSEGA considers the time restrictions and employs a
concession-based strategy to select the next oer up to its reservation
value.
In the rst phase of the negotiation, the accept mechanism will admit any
opponent oer that is 3% better than the utility of FSEGA's last proposal. It
will also always accept the best possible proposal. Otherwise, it selects a new
proposal, but if the previous opponent's oer is better than the upcoming
proposal it will accept it instead. After interval 1, it will also accept when it
cannot nd a better proposal for the opponent.
4.2.6 Agent Smith
Agent Smith [?] constructs an opponent model that represents the importance
and preference for all values of each issue. The agent starts by making a rst20 Baarslag et al.
proposal of maximum utility and subsequently concedes slowly towards the
opponent.
The agent accepts an oer given the following circumstances. The agents'
threshold for acceptance slowly decreases over time. In the last 10 seconds of
the negotiation session, Agent Smith will propose the best proposal that the
opponent already proposed (even when the oer is very bad for itself). Since
it previously proposed it, it is likely for a rational opponent to accept this
proposal. However, an error was made in the implementation, resulting in the
fact that the agent already shows this behavior after two minutes instead of
three. This explains the poor performance of the agent in the competition.
4.3 Timing Aspects
All agents of ANAC 2010, except for IAMcrazyHaggler, make concessions
when the deadline approaches. Because a break-o yields zero utility for both
agents, an agent that waits until the end of the negotiation takes a substantial
risk. The other agent may not know that the deadline is approaching and may
not concede fast enough. In addition, either the acceptance of a proposal or
the (acceptable) counter-oer may be received when the game is already over.
In the same manner, a real{time deadline also makes it necessary to employ
a mechanism for deciding when to accept an oer.
We study the inclination of the agents of ANAC 2010 to exhibit either
risk averse or risk seeking behavior regarding the timing of their proposals.
In order to get a good picture of the risk management of the agents, we
consider the number of break-os that occur for every agent. Table 5 lists
for each agent the percentage of negotiations that result in a break-o. All
break-os occur due to the deadline being reached or an occasional agent
crash on a big domain.
Break-o percentage per domain
Agent Itex-Cyp Eng-Zimb Travel Avg
Agent K 22% 6% 63% 30%
Yushu 36% 0% 90% 42%
Nozomi 25% 17% 75% 39%
IAMhaggler 11% 0% 63% 25%
FSEGA 22% 0% 100% 41%
IAMcrazyHaggler 72% 23% 83% 59%
Agent Smith 0% 0% 98% 33%
Table 5 Percentage of all failed negotiations of every agent per domain.
The number of break-os in the Travel domain stands out compared to the
other domains. Recall that this is the biggest domain of ANAC 2010, with5 Design of Future ANAC 21
188,160 possible proposals. Most of the agents had a lot of problems dealing
with this domain. In a large domain it takes too much time to enumerate
all proposals or to work with an elaborate opponent model. For example
the FSEGA agent was unable to nish a single negotiation. Only Agent K,
Nozomi and IAM(crazy)Haggler were able to eectively negotiate with each
other on this domain.
With respect to the number of break-os, IAMHaggler performs very well
on all domains, while IAMcrazyHaggler ranks as the worst of all agents.
This is to be expected, as its proposal generating mechanism does not take
into account the time or the opponent (see Section 4.2.4 for an overview of
its strategy). There is an interesting trade-o here: when IAMcrazyHaggler
manages to reach an agreement, it always scores a utility of at least 0.9, but
most of the time it scores 0 because the opponent will not budge.
The exact opposite of IAMcrazyHaggler is the strategy of Agent Smith.
Because of an implementation error, Agent Smith accepts any proposal after
two minutes, instead of three minutes. This explains why it did not have
any break-os on Itex{Cypress and England{Zimbabwe. The reason for the
break-os on the Travel domain is due to crashing of its opponent model.
The importance of the timing aspects is underlined by the performance of
Agent Smith: a small timing error resulted in very poor scoring on all three
domains.
5 Design of Future ANAC
After ANAC 2010 was held at AAMAS-10, the participating teams had a
closing discussion. This discussion yielded valuable suggestions for improving
the design of future ANAC competitions. The consensus among participants
was that the basic structure of the game should be retained. In the discussion
between the participating teams and interested parties, we decided to leave
further complicating factors out and not introduce too many innovations
for the next year. This includes issue interdependencies, a richer negotia-
tion protocol, dierent evaluation criteria, repeating scenarios (i.e.: multiple
negotiation sessions), self{play and changes to the real{time deadline setup.
For the next ANAC in 2011 we decided that the teams participated in the
rst ANAC agree on the modications to the rules and thus it was jointly
agreed that the following modications should be made into eect:
 Domains with discount factors should be included in the tournament.
 Changes should be made to the deadline setup and the selection criteria
of the domains, that is, how to select a wide variety of domains without
bias.
We detail the specic changes below.22 Baarslag et al.
5.0.1 Domains
ANAC 2011 will have domains that have discount factors. Without discount
factors the current negotiation setup oers no incentive to accept an oer,
except for right before the deadline. Waiting until the end of the round is an
optimal strategy, except in the rare case that the opponent makes a mistake
that might be retracted in the following round. Because of the lack of discount
factors, almost every negotiation between the agents took the entire negoti-
ation time of three minutes each to reach an agreement. Adding discount
factors should provide more interesting negotiations with faster deals. The
future ANAC setup could also be made more challenging by adding domains
that contain continuous issues, such as real{valued price issues.
5.0.2 Issue Predictability
When learning the opponent's preference prole, a learning technique usually
makes assumptions about the structure of the domain and preference prole
(e.g., [?, ?, ?]). Negotiation strategies can try to exploit the internal structure
of the issues in order to improve their prociency. For example, a learning
technique benets from the information that a certain issue is predictable.
Informally, an issue is called predictable when the global properties of its
evaluation function is known. To illustrate, let us consider the discrete issue
\Amount of funding" from the Zimbabwe{England domain (cf. Section 3.2).
Its values are: no agreement, $10 billion, $50 billion, or $100 billion. Even
when we do not know which party we are dealing with, we can be condent
that the utility of a particular value is either increasing or decreasing in the
amount of funding. A price issue like this is typically predictable, where more
is either better or worse for a negotiating party. Other issues, e.g. color, can
be less predictable and therefore learning the preferences of color is more
dicult. In order to improve the eciency of the learning algorithms, we
intend to eventually introduce (un)predictability labels.
5.0.3 Deadline
The real{time deadline of ANAC is considered a nice challenge to the com-
petitors. The agents had three minutes each to deliberate. This means agents
have to keep track of both their own time and the time the opponent has
left. For a future ANAC setup, we may choose a simpler protocol where both
agents have a shared time window of three minutes.6 Summary and Conclusion 23
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper describes the rst automated negotiating agents competition.
Based on the process, the submissions and the closing session of the com-
petition we believe that our aim has been accomplished. Recall that we set
out for this competition in order to steer the research in the area bilateral
multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition has achieved just that. Seven
teams have participated in the rst competition and we hope that many more
will participate in the following competitions.
One of the successes of ANAC lies in the development of state-of-the-art
negotiation strategies that co{evolve every year. This incarnation of ANAC
already yielded seven new strategies and we hope that next year will bring
even more sophisticated negotiation strategies. ANAC also has an impact
on the development of Genius. We have released a new, public build of
Genius1 containing all relevant aspects of ANAC. In particular, this includes
all domains, preference proles and agents that were used in the competition.
This will make the complete setup of ANAC available to the negotiation
research community.
Not only have we learnt from the strategy concepts introduced in ANAC,
we have also gained understanding in the correct setup of a negotiation com-
petition. The joint discussion with the teams gives great insights into the
organizing side of the competition.
To summarize, the agents developed for ANAC are the rst step towards
creating autonomous bargaining agents for real negotiation problems. We
plan to organize the second ANAC in conjunction with the next AAMAS
conference in 2011.
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